000			01342pab a2200157 454500
008			180718b1997 xxu||||| |||| 00| 0 eng d
100			_aHeer, Burkhard
245			_aUnemployment insurance versus welfare payments: a dynamic CGE analysis of employment and welfare effects
260			_c1997
300			_ap.367-93
520			_aThe effects of the social insurance system on employment and welfare are analyzed in a dynamic computable general equilibrium model. Two instruments of the social insurance system are considered: unemployment compensation, which is only paid to unemployed agents searching for a job, and welfare payments, which are paid to unemployed agents simply enjoying leisure. The model is calibrated for the German economy in order to get an estimate of the quantitative effects resulting from a change in the social insurance system. While welfare payments are shown to decrease both employment and welfare, this might not always be the case for unemployment insurance benefits. In facts, there is a nonzero optimal amount of unemployment insurance benefits. The welfare gains from a change in the social insurance system are proven to be substantial even after adjusting for transitional effects. - Reproduced.
650			_aEmployment
650			_aSocial security
773			_aPublic Finance
909			_a51459
999			_c51459 _d51459