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_c514645 _d514645 |
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| 008 | 201125b ||||| |||| 00| 0 eng d | ||
| 100 |
_aBubb, Ryan and Warren, Patrick L. _921439 |
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| 245 | _aAn equilibrium theory of retirement plan design | ||
| 260 | _aAmerican Economic Journal Economic Policy | ||
| 300 | _a12(2), May, 2020: p.22-45 | ||
| 520 | _aWe develop an equilibrium theory of employer-sponsored retirement plan design using a behavioral contract theory approach. The operation of the labor market results in retirement plans that generally cater to, rather than correct, workers' mistakes. Our theory provides new explanations for a range of facts about retirement plan design, including the use of employer matching contributions and the use of default contribution rates in automatic enrollment plans that lower many workers' savings. We provide novel evidence for our theory from a sample of plans. – Reproduced | ||
| 773 | _aAmerican Economic Journal Economic Policy | ||
| 906 | _aRETIREMENT | ||
| 942 | _cAR | ||