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| 008 | 201125b ||||| |||| 00| 0 eng d | ||
| 100 |
_aCellini, S.R. Darolia, and Turner, L.J. _921446 |
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| 245 | _aWhere do students go when for-profit colleges lose federal aid? | ||
| 260 | _aAmerican Economic Journal Economic Policy | ||
| 300 | _a12(2), May, 2020: p.46-83 | ||
| 520 | _aWe examine the effects of federal sanctions imposed on for-profit institutions in the 1990s. Using county-level variation in the timing and magnitude of sanctions linked to student loan default rates, we estimate that sanctioned for-profits experience a 68 percent decrease in annual enrollment following sanction receipt. Enrollment losses due to for-profit sanctions are 60–70 percent offset by increased enrollment within local community colleges, where students are less likely to default on federal student loans. Conversely, for-profit sanctions decrease enrollment in local unsanctioned for-profit competitors, likely due to improved information about local options and reputational spillovers. Overall, market enrollment declines by 2 percent. – Reproduced | ||
| 773 | _aAmerican Economic Journal Economic Policy | ||
| 906 | _aHIGHER EDUCATION | ||
| 942 | _cAR | ||