000			01295nam a22001577a 4500
999			_c514655 _d514655
008			201125b ||||| |||| 00| 0 eng d
100			_aAcemoglu,D. et al _921461
245			_aThe perils of high-powered incentives: Evidence from Colombia's false positives
260			_aAmerican Economic Journal : Economic Policy
300			_a12(3), Aug, 2020: p.1-43
520			_aWe investigate the use of high-powered incentives for the Colombian military and show that this practice produced perverse side effects. Innocent civilians were killed and misrepresented as guerillas (a phenomenon known in Colombia as "false positives"). There were significantly more false positives during the period of high-powered incentives in municipalities with weaker judicial institutions and where a higher share of brigades were commanded by colonels, who have stronger career concerns than generals. In municipalities with a higher share of colonels, the high-powered incentives period also coincided with a worsening of local judicial institutions and no discernible improvement in overall security. – Reproduced
650			_aConflict; Conflict Resolution; Alliances; Revolutions _921462
773			_aAmerican Economic Journal : Economic Policy
906			_aCONFLICT RESOLUTION
942			_cAR