000			01301nam a22001577a 4500
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100			_aGallagher, Justin. and Fisher, Paul J. _921518
245			_aCriminal deterrence when there are offsetting risks: Traffic cameras, vehicular accidents, and public safety
260			_aAmerican Economic Journal Economic Policy
300			_a 12(3), Aug, 2020: p.202-237
520			_aNumerous cities have enacted electronic monitoring programs at traffic intersections in an effort to reduce the high number of vehicle accidents. The rationale is that the higher expected fines for running a red light will induce drivers to stop and lead to fewer cross-road collisions. However, the cameras also incentivize drivers to accept a greater accident risk from stopping. We evaluate the termination of a monitoring program via a voter referendum using 12 years of geocoded police accident data. We find that the cameras changed the composition of accidents but no evidence of a reduction in total accidents or injuries. – Reproduced
650			_aTransportation: Demand, Supply, and Congestion; Travel Time; Safety and Accidents; Transportation Noise _921519
773			_aAmerican Economic Journal Economic Policy
906			_aTRANSPORTATION
942			_cAR