000			01202nam a22001577a 4500
999			_c514688 _d514688
008			201130b ||||| |||| 00| 0 eng d
100			_aHeller, Yuval and Winter, Eyal. _921559
245			_aBiased-belief equilibrium
260			_aAmerican Economic Journal : Microeconomics
300			_a12(2), May, 2020: p.1-40
520			_aWe investigate how distorted, yet structured, beliefs can persist in strategic situations. Specifically, we study two-player games in which each player is endowed with a biased-belief function that represents the discrepancy between a player's beliefs about the opponent's strategy and the actual strategy. Our equilibrium condition requires that (i) each player choose a best-response strategy to his distorted belief about the opponent's strategy, and (ii) the distortion functions form best responses to one another. We obtain sharp predictions and novel insights into the set of stable outcomes and their supporting stable biases in various classes of games. - Reproduced
650			_aStochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games; Repeated Games _921560
773			_aAmerican Economic Journal : Microeconomics
906			_aDECISION MAKING
942			_cAR