000			01259nam a22001577a 4500
999			_c514690 _d514690
008			201130b ||||| |||| 00| 0 eng d
100			_aEldar, Ofer and Magnolfi, Lorenzo. _921567
245			_aRegulatory competition and the market for corporate law
260			_aAmerican Economic Journal : Microeconomics
300			_a12(2), May, 2020: p.60-98
520			_aThis article develops an empirical model of firms' choice of corporate laws under inertia. Delaware dominates the incorporation market, though recently Nevada, a state whose laws are highly protective of managers, has acquired a sizable market share. Using a database of firm incorporation decisions from 1995 to 2013, we show that most firms dislike protectionist laws, such as anti-takeover statutes and liability protections for officers, and that Nevada's rise is due to the preferences of small firms. Consistent with the bonding hypothesis, our estimates indicate that despite inertia, Delaware would lose significant market share and revenues if it adopted protectionist laws. - Reproduced
650			_aMergers; Acquisitions; Restructuring; Voting; Proxy Contests _921568
773			_aAmerican Economic Journal : Microeconomics
906			_aCORPORATE GOVERNANCE
942			_cAR