000			01332nam a22001577a 4500
999			_c514692 _d514692
008			201130b ||||| |||| 00| 0 eng d
100			_aHanany, Eran. Peter, Klibanoff and Sujoy, Mukerji. _921572
245			_aCompetition, product proliferation, and welfare: A study of the US smartphone market
260			_aAmerican Economic Journal Microeconomics
300			_a12(2), May, 2020: p.135-187
520			_aWe study incomplete information games with ambiguity averse players. Our focus is on equilibrium concepts satisfying sequential optimality—each player's strategy is optimal at each information set given opponents' strategies. We show sequential optimality, which does not make any explicit assumption on updating, is equivalent to sequential optimality with respect to beliefs updated using a particular generalization of Bayesian updating. Ambiguity aversion expands the set of equilibria compatible with players sharing common ambiguous beliefs. We connect ambiguity aversion with belief robustness. Examples illustrate new strategic behavior, including strategic use of ambiguity, under ambiguity aversion. - Reproduced
650			_aMergers; Acquisitions; Restructuring; Voting; Proxy Contests _921573
773			_aAmerican Economic Journal Microeconomics
906			_aCORPORATE GOVERNANCE
942			_cAR