000			01238nam a22001577a 4500
999			_c514693 _d514693
008			201130b ||||| |||| 00| 0 eng d
100			_aKuvalekar, Aditya and Elliot, Lipnowski. _921570
245			_aJob Insecurity
260			_aAmerican Economic Journal Microeconomics
300			_a12(2), May, 2020: p. 188-229
520			_aWe examine the relationship between job security and productivity in a fixed wage worker-firm relationship facing match quality uncertainty. The worker's action affects both learning and current productivity. The firm, seeing worker behavior and outcomes, makes a firing decision. As bad news accrues, the firm cannot commit to retain the worker. This creates perverse incentives: the worker strategically slows learning, harming productivity. We fully characterize the unique equilibrium in our continuous-time game. Consistent with some evidence in organizational psychology, the relationship between job insecurity and productivity is U-shaped: a worker is least productive when his job is moderately secure. - Reproduced
650			_aHuman Capital; Skills; Occupational Choice; Labor Productivity _921571
773			_aAmerican Economic Journal : Microeconomics
906			_aLABOUR
942			_cAR