000			01294nam a22001457a 4500
999			_c514694 _d514694
008			201130b ||||| |||| 00| 0 eng d
100			_aSchenone, Pablo. _921577
245			_aRevealed preference implications of backward induction and subgame perfection
260			_aAmerican Economic Journal Microeconomics
300			_a12(2), May, 2020: p. 230-256
520			_aConsider a decision-maker (DM) who must select an alternative from a set of mutually exclusive alternatives but must take this decision sequentially. If the DM's choice correspondence over subsets of alternatives satisfies the weak axiom of revealed preference (WARP), then the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium (SPNE) and backward induction (BI) strategies coincide. We study the relation between the SPNE and BI strategies when the DM's choice correspondence fails to satisfy WARP. First, Sen's axiom alpha is necessary and sufficient for the set of SPNE strategies to be a subset of the set of BI strategies; moreover, a mild strengthening of Sen's axiom β is necessary and sufficient for the set of BI strategies to be a subset of the set of SPNE strategies. These results extend to multiplayer games. - Reproduced
773			_aAmerican Economic Journal Microeconomics
906			_aDECISION MAKING
942			_cAR