000			01220nam a22001577a 4500
999			_c514697 _d514697
008			201130b ||||| |||| 00| 0 eng d
100			_aGersbach, Hans. _921589
245			_aHistory-bound reelections
260			_aAmerican Economic Journal : Microeconomics
300			_a12(3), Aug, 2020: p. 33-75
520			_aWe introduce history-bound reelections. In their simple form, they consist in a "score-replication rule." Under such a rule, an incumbent has to match the highest vote share he or she has obtained in any previous election in order to be reelected. We develop a simple three-period model to examine score-replication rules. We show that suitable variants of such rules can improve welfare, as they reduce the tendency of reelected incumbents to indulge in their own preferences, and they ensure that able officeholders are reelected. Candidates might offer their own score-replication rule in campaigns. We outline how political competition may be affected by such new forms of elections. - Reproduced
650			_aRent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior _921590
773			_aAmerican Economic Journal : Microeconomics
906			_aPOLITICAL PROCESSES
942			_cAR