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100			_aMass,Helene. et al. _921602
245			_aImitation perfection : A simple Rule to prevent discrimination in procurement
260			_a American Economic Journal Microeconomics
300			_a12(3), Aug, 2020: p.189-245
520			_aProcurement regulation aimed at curbing discrimination requires equal treatment of sellers. However, Deb and Pai (2017) show that such regulation imposes virtually no restrictions on the ability to discriminate. We propose a simple rule—imitation perfection—that restricts discrimination significantly. It ensures that in every equilibrium, bidders with the same valuation distribution and the same valuation earn the same expected utility. If all bidders are homogeneous, revenue and social surplus optimal auctions consistent with imitation perfection exist. For heterogeneous bidders, however, it is incompatible with revenue and social surplus optimization. Thus, a trade-off between non-discrimination and optimality exists. - Reproduced
773			_a American Economic Journal Microeconomics
906			_aAUCTIONS
942			_cAR