000			01201nam a22001577a 4500
999			_c514702 _d514702
008			201130b ||||| |||| 00| 0 eng d
100			_aHenry, Emeric. and Sidois, Louis Charles. _921599
245			_aVoting and contributing when the group is watching
260			_aAmerican Economic Journal Microeconomics
300			_a12(3), Aug, 2020: p.246-276
520			_aMembers of groups and organizations often have to decide on rules that regulate their contributions to common tasks. They typically differ in their propensity to contribute and often care about the image they project; in particular, they want to be perceived by other group members as being high contributors. In such environments we study the interaction between how members vote on rules and their subsequent contribution decisions. We show that making contributions visible affects the calculus of reputation and the voting decisions, and can be welfare decreasing as it makes some rules more likely to be rejected. - Reproduced
650			_aRent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior _921600
773			_aAmerican Economic Journal Microeconomics
906			_aPOLITICAL PROCESSES
942			_cAR