000			01209nam a22001577a 4500
999			_c515328 _d515328
008			210121b ||||| |||| 00| 0 eng d
100			_aMukand, Sharun W, and Radnik, Dani _923662
245			_aThe political economy of liberal democracy
260			_aThe Economic Journal
300			_a130(627), Apr, 2020: p.765-792
520			_aThis paper develops a taxonomy of political regimes that distinguishes between three sets of rights—property rights, political rights and civil rights. The truly distinctive nature of liberal democracy is the protection of civil rights (equal treatment by the state for all groups) in addition to the other two. The paper shows how democratic transitions that are the product of a settlement between the elite (who care mostly about property rights) and the majority (who care about political rights), generically fail to produce liberal democracy. Instead, the emergence of liberal democracy requires low levels of inequality and weak identity cleavages. – Reproduced
650			_aProperty rights, Property rights, Civil rights, Civil rights, Liberal democracy _923656
773			_aThe Economic Journal
906			_aPOLITICAL ECONOMY
942			_cAR