000			01189nam a22001577a 4500
999			_c515330 _d515330
008			210122b ||||| |||| 00| 0 eng d
100			_aChen, Yanlin, and Zhang, Jun _923666
245			_aSingalling by Bayesian persuasion and pricing strategy
260			_aThe Economic Journal
300			_a130(628), May, 2020: p.976-1007
520			_aThis article investigates how a privately informed seller could signal her type through Bayesian persuasion and pricing strategy. We find that it is generally impossible to achieve separation through one channel alone. Furthermore, the outcome that survives the intuitive criterion always exists and is unique. This outcome is separating, for which a closed-form solution is provided. The signalling concern forces the high-type seller to disclose inefficiently more information and charge a higher price, resulting in fewer sales and lower profit. Finally, we show that a regulation on minimal quality could potentially hurt social welfare, and private information hurts the seller. – Reproduced
650			_aBayesian persuasion, Pricing strategy _923667
773			_aThe Economic Journal
906			_aPRICING STRATEGY
942			_cAR