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100			_aCarranza, A.S., Albareda, A. and Federo, R. _924200
245			_aNetwork tasks and accountability: A configurational analysis of EU regulatory networks
260			_aPublic Administration
300			_a98(2), Jun, 2020: p.480-497
520			_aIntergovernmental networks have become a prominent cooperative mechanism to deal with trans‐boundary and interdependent problems. Yet, we still have limited knowledge of how these collaborative endeavours are governed, which is crucial to properly understanding how they function. This article empirically examines the structural governance configurations of rule‐enforcing networks in the European Union. The article relies on data from 37 networks with rule‐enforcing tasks and conducts a qualitative comparative analysis. We find three basic governance structure configurations used by rule‐enforcing networks: first, a configuration with legal accountability, which is characterized by having a board of appeals; second, one with administrative accountability that, in addition to a board of appeals, has powerful executive boards and professional experts in the network plenary; and a third one with democratic accountability that incorporates legislative representatives in the network plenary. We argue that these results show how network tasks are related to accountability and governance. – Reproduced
773			_aPublic Administration
906			_aEUROPEAN UNION
942			_cAR