000			01529nam a22001457a 4500
999			_c515906 _d515906
008			210211b ||||| |||| 00| 0 eng d
100			_aLuttmann, Alexander and Nehiba, Cody _924203
245			_aThe effects of employee hours‐of‐service regulations on the U.S. airline industry
260			_a Journal of Policy Analysis and Management
300			_a39(4), Fall, 2020: p. 1043-1075
520			_aMaximum employee work‐hour restrictions are implemented to reduce accidents. However, because they decrease the stock of work hours available to employers in the short run, they may also have detrimental effects. A quasi‐experiment suggests that pilot hours‐of‐service reforms, which decreased the number of flights and hours a pilot may work, reduced consumer choice and increased fares in the airline industry. We find that regional and low‐cost carriers reduced scheduled flight frequency, while less constrained legacy carriers (and potentially their wholly owned subsidiaries) were unaffected. Further, we find evidence that market concentration increased on many routes, implying that fare increases may be due to a decrease in competition. These findings suggest a situation where a policy implemented to correct one market failure, airlines not internalizing the full social costs of accidents by allowing dangerously fatigued pilots to fly, exacerbated another market failure by decreasing competition.
773			_a Journal of Policy Analysis and Management
906			_aCIVIL AVIATION
942			_cAR