| 000 | 01089nam a22001457a 4500 | ||
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_c515999 _d515999 |
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| 008 | 210212b ||||| |||| 00| 0 eng d | ||
| 100 |
_aMitra, Nilanjana Biswas _924221 |
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| 245 | _aIPR regulatory policy, tariff and entry modes of MNC | ||
| 260 | _aArtha Vijnana | ||
| 300 | _a62(3), Sep, 2020: p.257-281 | ||
| 520 | _aThe paper links the optional IPR rate and tariff rate chosen by a less developed country (LDC) government to the mode of entry of a multinational corporation (MNC) in it. The MNC can either export or fragment the production structure by shafting assembly line units to the LDC where the cost of assembling the product is lower. Under fragmentation, a commercial pirate can copy the products with positive probability and the MNC insure anti copying investment to deter piracy. The results how that under different combinations of copying the probability of the pirate and cost incentive of fragmentation of difference equilibrium configuration can be chose. – Reproduced | ||
| 773 | _aArtha Vijnana | ||
| 906 | _aINTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS | ||
| 942 | _cAR | ||