000			01375nam a22001577a 4500
999			_c516306 _d516306
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100			_aCollins, Stephanie _925083
245			_aAre organizations' religious exemptions democratically defensible?
260			_aDaedalus
300			_a149(3), Summer 2020: p.105-118
520			_aTheorists of democratic multiculturalism have long defended individuals' religious exemptions from generally applicable laws. Examples include Sikhs being exempt from motorcycle helmet laws, or Jews and Muslims being exempt from humane animal slaughter laws. This essay investigates religious exemptions for organizations. Should organizations ever be granted exemptions from generally applicable laws in democratic societies, where those exemptions are justified by the organization's religion? This essay considers four arguments for such exemptions, which respectively rely on the “transferring up” to organizations of individuals' claims to autonomy or recognition; organizations' own claims to autonomy or recognition; organizations' status in the accountability community; and organizations' procedural constraints. The essay concludes that only the last argument holds up – and then, only with caveats. - Reproduced
650			_aMulticulturalism, Sikhs, _925084
773			_aDaedalus
906			_aRELIGION
942			_cAR