000			01242nam a22001577a 4500
999			_c516374 _d516374
008			210223b ||||| |||| 00| 0 eng d
100			_aGagliarducci, Stefano and Manacorda, Marco _925193
245			_aPolitics in the family: Nepotism and the hiring decisions of Italian firms
260			_aAmerican Economic Journal: Applied Economics
300			_a12(2), Apr, 2020: p.67-95
520			_aThis paper studies the effect of family connections to politicians on individuals' labor market outcomes. Using data for Italy spanning more than three decades on a sample of almost one million individuals plus data on the universe of individuals holding political office, we show that politicians extract significant rents, in terms of private sector jobs, for their family members. We present evidence consistent with the hypothesis that this phenomenon is a form of corruption, i.e., a quid pro quo exchange between firms and politicians, although arguably an inferior substitute for easier-to-detect modes of rent appropriation on the part of politicians. - Reproduced
650			_aNepotism, Family connections, Politics, Corruption _925194
773			_aAmerican Economic Journal: Applied Economics 1
906			_aNEPOTISM
942			_cAR