000			01387nam a22001577a 4500
999			_c516401 _d516401
008			210224b ||||| |||| 00| 0 eng d
100			_aBanerjee, Abhijit _925245
245			_aE-governance, accountability, and leakage in public programs: Experimental evidence from a financial management reform in India
260			_aAmerican Economic Journal: Applied Economics
300			_a12(4), Oct, 2020: p.39-72
520			_aCan e-governance reforms improve government policy? By making information available on a real-time basis, information technologies may reduce the theft of public funds. We analyze a large field experiment and the nationwide scale-up of a reform to India's workfare program. Advance payments were replaced by "just-in-time" payments, triggered by e-invoicing, making it easier to detect misreporting. Leakages went down: program expenditures dropped by 24 percent, while employment slightly increased; there were fewer fake households in the official database; and program officials' personal wealth fell by 10 percent. However, payment delays increased. The nationwide scale-up resulted in a persistent 19 percent reduction in program expenditure. – Reproduced
650			_aFinancial management reform, Government policy, Information technologies _925246
773			_aAmerican Economic Journal: Applied Economics
906			_aE- GOVERNANCE
942			_cAR