000			01287nam a22001577a 4500
999			_c516525 _d516525
008			210226b ||||| |||| 00| 0 eng d
100			_aWilson, Alistarir J. and Vespa, Emanuel _925707
245			_aInformation transmission under the shadow of the future: An experiment
260			_aAmerican Economic Journal: Microeconomics
300			_a12(4), Nov, 2020: p.75-98
520			_aWe experimentally examine how information transmission functions in an ongoing relationship. Where the one-shot cheap-talk literature documents substantial overcommunication and preferences for honesty, the outcomes in our repeated setting are more consistent with uninformative babbling outcomes. This is particularly surprising, as honest revelation is supportable as an equilibrium outcome in our repeated setting. We show that inefficient outcomes are driven by a coordination failure on how to distribute the gains from information sharing. However, when agents can coordinate on the payment of an "information rent," honest revelation emerges. – Reproduced
650			_aInformation and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness, Design of Experiments, Laboratory, Group Behavior _925708
773			_aAmerican Economic Journal: Microeconomics
906			_aCOMMUNICATION
942			_cAR