000			01311nam a22001577a 4500
999			_c516553 _d516553
008			210226b ||||| |||| 00| 0 eng d
100			_aJohan, N. M. Lagerlof _925713
245			_aHybrid all-pay and winner-pay contests
260			_aAmerican Economic Journal: Microeconomics
300			_a12(4), Nov, 2020: p.144-169
520			_aIn many contests in economic and political life, both all-pay and winner-pay expenditures matter for winning. This paper studies such hybrid contests under symmetry and asymmetry. The symmetric model assumes very little structure but yields a simple closed-form solution. More contestants tend to lead to substitution toward winner-pay investments, and total expenditures are always lower than in the corresponding all-pay contest. With a biased decision process and two contestants, the favored contestant wins with a higher likelihood, chooses less winner-pay investments, and contributes more to total expenditures. An endogenous bias that maximizes total expenditures disfavors the high-valuation contestant but still makes her the more likely one to win. – Reproduced
650			_aRent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior _925714
773			_aAmerican Economic Journal: Microeconomics
906			_aPOLITICAL PROCESSES
942			_cAR