000			01186nam a22001577a 4500
999			_c516554 _d516554
008			210226b ||||| |||| 00| 0 eng d
100			_aMauring, Eeva _925711
245			_aInformational cycles in search markets
260			_aAmerican Economic Journal: Microeconomics
300			_a12(4), Nov, 2020: p.170-192
520			_aI show that market participants' equilibrium beliefs can create fluctuations in the volume of trading, even in a stationary environment. I study a sequential search model where buyers face an unknown distribution of offers. Each buyer learns about the distribution by observing whether a randomly chosen buyer traded yesterday. A cyclical equilibrium exists where the informational content of observing a trade fluctuates, which leads to fluctuations in the volume of trading. The cyclical equilibrium is more efficient than steady-state equilibria. The efficiency result holds also if buyers get a signal about past transaction prices or past trading volumes. – Reproduced
650			_aAsymmetric and private information; Mechanism design _925712
773			_aAmerican Economic Journal: Microeconomics
906			_aCOMMUNICATION
942			_cAR