000			01090nam a22001577a 4500
999			_c516556 _d516556
008			210226b ||||| |||| 00| 0 eng d
100			_aBiglaiser, Gary and Cremer, Jacques _925717
245			_aValue of incumbency: when platforms face heterogeneous customers
260			_aAmerican Economic Journal: Microeconomics
300			_a12(4), Nov, 2020: p.229-269
520			_aWe study competition for the market in a dynamic model with network externalities, focusing on the efficiency of market outcomes. We propose a representation of the strategic advantages of incumbency and embed it in a dynamic framework with heterogeneous consumers. Then, we completely identify the conditions under which inefficient equilibria with several platforms emerge at equilibrium; explore the reasons why these inefficient equilibria arise; and compute the value of incumbency and analyze why static models generally exaggerate it. – Reproduced
650			_aMarket Structure, Pricing, Oligopoly _925718
773			_aAmerican Economic Journal: Microeconomics
906			_aCONSUMERS
942			_cAR