000			01046nam a22001577a 4500
999			_c516557 _d516557
008			210226b ||||| |||| 00| 0 eng d
100			_aBenkert, Jean-Michel and Letina, Igor _925715
245			_aDesigning dynamic research contests
260			_aAmerican Economic Journal: Microeconomics
300			_a12(4), Nov, 2020: p.270-289
520			_aThis paper studies the optimal design of dynamic research contests. We introduce interim transfers, which are paid in every period while the contest is ongoing, to an otherwise standard setting. We show that a contest where (i) the principal can stop the contest in any period, (ii) a constant interim transfer is paid to agents in each period while the contest is ongoing, and (iii) a final prize is paid once the principal stops the contest, is optimal for the principal and implements the first-best.
650			_aManagement of Technological Innovation, Research and development _925716
773			_aAmerican Economic Journal: Microeconomics
906			_aRESEARCH DESIGN
942			_cAR