000			01203nam a22001577a 4500
999			_c517087 _d517087
008			210630b ||||| |||| 00| 0 eng d
100			_aGorton, Gary and Ordonez, Guillermo _926087
245			_aFighting Crises with Secrecy
260			_aAmerican Economic Journal Macroeconomics
300			_a12(4), Oct, 2020: p.218-245
520			_aHow does central bank lending during a crisis restore confidence? Emergency lending facilities that are opaque (in that names of borrowers are kept secret) raise the perceived average quality of bank assets in the economy, creating an information externality that prevents runs. Stigma (the cost of a bank's participation at the lending facility becoming public) is desirable to implement opacity as an equilibrium outcome, as no bank wants to reveal its participation status. The central bank's key policy instrument for limiting the use of lending facilities while maintaining secrecy is the haircut applied to bank assets used as collateral. – Reproduced
650			_aBanks; Depository Institutions; Micro Finance Institutions; Mortgages _926088
773			_aAmerican Economic Journal Macroeconomics
906			_aFINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS
942			_cAR