000			01218nam a22001457a 4500
999			_c517263 _d517263
008			210707b ||||| |||| 00| 0 eng d
100			_aColonnelli, Emanuele, Prem, Mounu and Teso, Edoardo _926247
245			_aPatronage and selection in public sector organizations
260			_aThe American Economic Review
300			_a110(10), Oct, 2020: p.3071-3099
520			_aIn all modern bureaucracies, politicians retain some discretion in public employment decisions, which may lead to frictions in the selection process if political connections substitute for individual competence. Relying on detailed matched employer-employee data on the universe of public employees in Brazil over 1997–2014, and on a regression discontinuity design in close electoral races, we establish three main findings. First, political connections are a key and quantitatively large determinant of employment in public organizations, for both bureaucrats and frontline providers. Second, patronage is an important mechanism behind this result. Third, political considerations lead to the selection of less competent individuals. – Reproduced
773			_aThe American Economic Review
906			_aPUBLIC SECTORS
942			_cAR