000			00968nam a22001457a 4500
999			_c517269 _d517269
008			210707b ||||| |||| 00| 0 eng d
100			_aLevine, David K. and Mattozzi, Andrea _926237
245			_aVoter turnout with peer punishment
260			_aThe American Economic Review
300			_a110(10), Oct, 2020: p.3298-3314
520			_aWe introduce a model where social norms of voting participation are strategically chosen by competing political parties and determine voters' turnout. Social norms must be enforced through costly peer monitoring and punishment. When the cost of enforcement of social norms is low, the larger party is always advantaged. Otherwise, in the spirit of Olson (1965), the smaller party may be advantaged. Our model shares features of the ethical voter model and it delivers novel and empirically relevant comparative statics results. – Reproduced
773			_aThe American Economic Review
906			_aELECTION
942			_cAR