000			01485nam a22001577a 4500
999			_c517300 _d517300
008			210708b ||||| |||| 00| 0 eng d
100			_aFont, Nuria _926349
245			_aCompeting Principals and Non-Vote Decisions in the European Parliament
260			_bParliamentary Affairs: A Journal of Representative Politics
300			_a73(1), Jan, 2020: p.166-185
520			_aThis article analyses the effects of competing principals on legislators’ decisions not to vote in the European Parliament. We argue that Members of the European Parliament (MEPs) are likely to decide not to vote to avoid defecting from either the national party or the European political group when both political principals disagree. Moreover, the article demonstrates that competing demands between principals interact with the expected closeness of a vote. MEPs are more likely to opt for not voting when they have few chances to influence the vote outcome and are torn between the two main principals. Based on a novel data set on individual votes in the 2009–2014 term, this article demonstrates that competing demands moderate the effect of the expected vote closeness on non-vote decisions and highlights the need to incorporate this type of legislative non-response in future research.- Reproduced
650			_aEuropean Parliament, Members of the European Parliament _926350
773			_aParliamentary Affairs: A Journal of Representative Politics
906			_aEUROPEAN UNION
942			_cAR