000			01255nam a22001577a 4500
999			_c517340 _d517340
008			210710b ||||| |||| 00| 0 eng d
100			_aJann, Ole and Schottmuller, Chrisoph _926470
245			_aAn informational theory of privacy
260			_aThe Economic Journal: A Journal of the Royal Economic Society
300			_a130(625), Jan, 2020: p.93-124
520			_aPrivacy of consumers or citizens is often seen as an inefficient information asymmetry. We challenge this view by showing that privacy can increase welfare in an informational sense. It can also improve information aggregation and prevent inefficient statistical discrimination. We show how and when the different informational effects of privacy line up to make privacy efficient or even Pareto-optimal. Our theory can be applied to decide who should have which information and how privacy and information disclosure should be regulated. We discuss applications to online privacy, credit decisions and transparency in government. – Reproduced
650			_aPolitical Processes, Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, Voting Behavior _926471
773			_aThe Economic Journal: A Journal of the Royal Economic Society
906			_aPOLITICAL PROCESSES
942			_cAR