000			01108nam a22001457a 4500
999			_c517345 _d517345
008			210710b ||||| |||| 00| 0 eng d
100			_aObsborne, M.J., Rosenthal, J.S. and Stewart, C. _926463
245			_aInformation aggregation with costly reporting
260			_aThe Economic Journal: A Journal of the Royal Economic Society
300			_a130(625), Jan, 2020: p.208-232
520			_aA group of privately informed individuals with common interests chooses a binary option. Each individual chooses whether to reveal her signal, at a cost. If the group is large and cannot commit to a decision rule then it takes the correct decision with high probability in one state but with probability bounded away from one in the other. It cannot do better by committing to an anonymous decision rule without transfers, but can achieve the first best if transfers between individuals are possible, and can approximately achieve the first best with a non-anonymous decision rule.- Reproduced
773			_aThe Economic Journal: A Journal of the Royal Economic Society
906			_aMASS MEDIA
942			_cAR