000			01210nam a22001577a 4500
999			_c517356 _d517356
008			210710b ||||| |||| 00| 0 eng d
100			_aLeshno, Jacob D. and Strack, Philipp _926445
245			_aBitcoin: An axiomatic approach and an impossibility theorem
260			_aThe American Economic Review: Insights
300			_a2(3), Sep, 2020: p.269-286
520			_aBitcoin's main innovation lies in allowing a decentralized system that relies on anonymous, profit-driven miners who can freely join the system. We formalize these properties in three axioms: anonymity of miners, no incentives for miners to consolidate, and no incentive to assuming multiple fake identities. This novel axiomatic formalization allows us to characterize what other protocols are feasible: every protocol with these properties must have the same reward scheme as Bitcoin. This implies an impossibility result for risk-averse miners. Furthermore, any protocol either gives up on some degree of decentralization or its reward scheme is equivalent to Bitcoin's. - Reproduced
650			_aCryptocurrencies, Blockchains _926446
773			_aThe American Economic Review: Insights
906			_aCRYPTOCURRENCIES
942			_cAR