000			01381nam a22001577a 4500
999			_c517363 _d517363
008			210710b ||||| |||| 00| 0 eng d
100			_aArmand, A., Coutts, A. and Vicente, P.C. _926430
245			_aDoes information break the political resource curse: Experimental evidence from mozambique
260			_aThe American Economic Review 1
300			_a10(11), Nov, 2020: p.3431-3453
520			_aNatural resources can have a negative impact on the economy through corruption and civil conflict. This paper tests whether information can counteract this political resource curse. We implement a large-scale field experiment following the dissemination of information about a substantial natural gas discovery in Mozambique. We measure outcomes related to the behavior of citizens and local leaders through georeferenced conflict data, behavioral activities, lab-in-the-field experiments, and surveys. We find that information targeting citizens and their involvement in public deliberations increases local mobilization and decreases violence. By contrast, when information reaches only local leaders, it increases elite capture and rent-seeking. - Reproduced
650			_aRent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior D74 Conflict; Conflict Resolution _926431
773			_aThe American Economic Review
906			_aPOLITICAL PROCESSES
942			_cAR