000			01084nam a22001457a 4500
999			_c517365 _d517365
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100			_aBasak, Deepal and Deb, Joyee _926428
245			_aGambling over public opinion
260			_aThe American Economic Review
300			_a110(11), Nov, 2020: p.3492-3521
520			_aWe consider bargaining environments in which public opinion provides leverage by making compromises costly. Two parties make initial demands, before knowing the public opinion. If deadlocked, they can bargain again after public opinion forms, but suffer reputation costs if they compromise, i.e., scale back their demands. We show that in equilibrium, parties may choose to make incompatible demands initially and gamble over public opinion even though one or both parties must bear a cost later. We characterize when deadlocks arise, and how this affects the welfare of the public in a representative two-party democracy compared to a direct democracy. - Reproduced
773			_aThe American Economic Review
906			_aPUBLIC OPINION
942			_cAR