000			01372nam a22001577a 4500
999			_c517615 _d517615
008			210722b ||||| |||| 00| 0 eng d
100			_aBazzi, Samuel, and Gudgeon, Matthew _927343
245			_aThe political boundaries of ethnic divisions
260			_aAmerican Economic Journal: Applied Economics
300			_a13(1), Jan, 2021: p.235-266
520			_aWe use a policy experiment in Indonesia to show how local political boundaries affect ethnic tension. Redrawing district borders along group lines reduces conflict. However, the gains in stability are undone or even reversed when new boundaries increase ethnic polarization. Greater polarization leads to more violence around majoritarian elections but has little effect around lower-stakes, proportional representation elections. These results point to distinct incentives for violence in winner-take-all settings with contestable public resources. Overall, our findings illustrate the promise and pitfalls of redrawing borders in diverse countries where it is infeasible for each group to have its own administrative unit. – Reproduced
650			_aPolitical Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior, Conflict; Conflict Resolution; Alliances; Revolutions _927344
773			_aAmerican Economic Journal: Applied Economics
906			_aELECTIONS
942			_cAR