| 000 | 01119nam a22001577a 4500 | ||
|---|---|---|---|
| 999 |
_c517617 _d517617 |
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| 008 | 210722b ||||| |||| 00| 0 eng d | ||
| 100 |
_aAbdulkadiroğlu, Atila, et al _927353 |
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| 245 | _aEfficiency, justified envy, and incentives in priority-based matching | ||
| 260 | _aThe American Economic Review: Insights | ||
| 300 | _a2(4), Dec, 2020: p.425-442 | ||
| 520 | _aTop trading cycles (TTC ) is Pareto efficient and strategy-proof in priority-based matching, but so are other mechanisms including serial dictatorship. We show that TTC minimizes justified envy among all Pareto-efficient and strategy-proof mechanisms in one-to-one matching. In many-to-one matching, TTC admits less justified envy than serial dictatorship in an average sense. Empirical evidence from New Orleans OneApp and Boston Public Schools shows that TTC has significantly less justified envy than serial dictatorship. – Reproduced | ||
| 650 |
_aBargaining Theory, Matching theory, Allocative efficiency, Cost-benefit analysis _927354 |
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| 773 | _aThe American Economic Review: Insights | ||
| 906 | _aBARGAINING THEORY | ||
| 942 | _cAR | ||