000			01245nam a22001577a 4500
999			_c517619 _d517619
008			210722b ||||| |||| 00| 0 eng d
100			_aDasgupta, Partha and Maskin, Eric _927349
245			_aStrategy-proofness, independence of irrelevant alternatives, and majority rule
260			_aThe American Economic Review: Insights
300			_a2(4), Dec, 2020: p.459-474
520			_aWe show that strategy-proofness, the Pareto principle, anonymity, neutrality, independence of irrelevant alternatives, and decisiveness uniquely characterize majority rule on any domain of preferences for which there exists a voting rule satisfying these axioms. In our formulation, strategy-proofness includes manipulations by coalitions. However, we demonstrate that the characterization still holds when coalitions are restricted to arbitrarily small size. We also show that when coalitions can manipulate outside the domain, there is an extension of majority rule that satisfies these axioms on any domain without Condorcet cycles. – Reproduced
650			_aPolitical Processes, Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, Voting behavior _927350
773			_aThe American Economic Review: Insights
906			_aELECTIONS
942			_cAR