000			01241nam a22001577a 4500
999			_c517628 _d517628
008			210722b ||||| |||| 00| 0 eng d
100			_aSugaya, Takuo and Wolitzky, Alexander _927367
245			_aA few bad apples spoil the barrel: An anti-folk theorem for anonymous repeated games with incomplete information
260			_aThe American Economic Review
300			_a110(12), Dec, 2020: p.3817-3835
520			_aWe study anonymous repeated games where players may be "commitment types" who always take the same action. We establish a stark anti-folk theorem: if the distribution of the number of commitment types satisfies a smoothness condition and the game has a "pairwise dominant" action, this action is almost always taken. This implies that cooperation is impossible in the repeated prisoner's dilemma with anonymous random matching. We also bound equilibrium payoffs for general games. Our bound implies that industry profits converge to zero in linear-demand Cournot oligopoly as the number of firms increases. – Reproduced
650			_aNoncooperative Games C73 Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games; Repeated Games _927368
773			_aThe American Economic Review
906			_aGAMES THEORY
942			_cAR