000			01183nam a22001457a 4500
999			_c517946 _d517946
008			210806b ||||| |||| 00| 0 eng d
100			_aJohnston, Andrew C. _928286
245			_aUnemployment insurance taxes and labor demand: Quasi-experimental evidence from administrative Data
260			_a American Economic Journal: Economic Policy
300			_a13(1), Feb, 2021: p.266-293
520			_aTo finance unemployment insurance, states raise payroll tax rates on employers who engage in layoffs. Tax rates are, therefore, highest for firms after downturns, potentially hampering labor-market recovery. Using full-population, administrative records from Florida, I estimate the effect of these tax increases on firm behavior leveraging a regression kink design in the tax schedule. Tax hikes reduce hiring and employment substantially, with no effect on layoffs or wages. The results imply unanticipated costs of the financing regime which reduce the optimal benefit by a quarter and account for 12 percent of the unemployment in the wake of the Great Recession. – Reproduced
773			_a American Economic Journal: Economic Policy
906			_aEMPLOYMENT
942			_cAR