000			01474nam a22001457a 4500
999			_c517960 _d517960
008			210806b ||||| |||| 00| 0 eng d
100			_aHemel, Daniel _928328
245			_aCan structural changes fix the Supreme Court?
260			_aThe Journal of Economic Perspectives
300			_a35(1), Winter, 2021: p.119-142
520			_aProposals for structural changes to the US Supreme Court have attracted attention in recent years amid a perceived “legitimacy crisis” afflicting the institution. This article first assesses whether the court is in fact facing a legitimacy crisis and then considers whether prominent reform proposals are likely to address the institutional weaknesses that reformers aim to resolve. The article concludes that key trends purportedly contributing to the crisis at the court are more ambiguous in their empirical foundations and normative implications than reformers often suggest. It also argues that prominent reform proposals—including term limits, age limits, lottery selection of justices, and explicit partisan balance requirements for court membership—are unlikely to resolve the institutional flaws that proponents perceive. It ends by suggesting a more modest (though novel) reform, which would allocate two lifetime appointments per presidential term and allow the size of the court to fluctuate within bounds. – Reproduced
773			_aThe Journal of Economic Perspectives
906			_aSUPREME COURT
942			_cAR