000			01213nam a22001577a 4500
999			_c517969 _d517969
008			210806b ||||| |||| 00| 0 eng d
100			_aSchummer, James Velez, Rodrigo A. _928780
245			_aSequential preference revelation in incomplete information settings
260			_aAmerican Economic Journal: Microeconomics
300			_a13(1), Feb, 2021: p.116-147
520			_aStrategy-proof allocation rules incentivize truthfulness in simultaneous move games, but real world mechanisms sometimes elicit preferences sequentially. Surprisingly, even when the underlying rule is strategy-proof and non-bossy, sequential elicitation can yield equilibria where agents have a strict incentive to be untruthful. This occurs only under incomplete information, when an agent anticipates that truthful reporting would signal false private information about others’ references. We provide conditions ruling out this phenomenon, guaranteeing all equilibrium outcomes to be welfare-equivalent to truthful ones.- Reproduced
650			_aStrategy-proofness; Sequential mechanisms; Implementation; Market design _928781
773			_aAmerican Economic Journal: Microeconomics
906			_aMARKET DESIGN
942			_cAR