000			01093nam a22001457a 4500
999			_c517970 _d517970
008			210806b ||||| |||| 00| 0 eng d
100			_aBizzotto, J., Rudiger, J. and Vigier, A _928299
245			_aDynamic persuasion with outside information
260			_aAmerican Economic Journal: Microeconomics
300			_a13(1), Feb, 2021: p.179-194
520			_aA principal seeks to persuade an agent to accept an offer of uncertain value before a deadline expires. The principal can generate information, but exerts no control over exogenous outside information. The combined effect of the deadline and outside information creates incentives for the principal to keep uncertainty high in the first periods so as to persuade the agent close to the deadline. We characterize the equilibrium, compare it to the single-player decision problem in which exogenous outside information is the agent's only source of information, and examine the welfare implications of our analysis. – Reproduced
773			_aAmerican Economic Journal: Microeconomics
906			_aDECISION MAKING
942			_cAR