000			00997nam a22001577a 4500
999			_c518033 _d518033
008			210810b ||||| |||| 00| 0 eng d
100			_aKrähmer, Daniel _928425
245			_aInformation design and strategic communication
260			_aThe American Economic Review: Insights
300			_a3(1), Mar, 2021: p.51-66
520			_aI study sender-receiver games where the receiver can disclose information to the sender by designing an information structure. I show that by secretly randomizing over information structures, the receiver can virtually attain her complete information payoff even for large conflicts of interest. The key insight is that private knowledge of the information structure induces truthful communication because it allows the receiver to cross-check the consistency of the sender's report. – Reproduced
650			_aInformation structure, Communication _928426
773			_aThe American Economic Review: Insights
906			_aINFORMATION DESIGN
942			_cAR