000			01629nam a22001577a 4500
999			_c518097 _d518097
008			210817b ||||| |||| 00| 0 eng d
100			_aTadeo, A.J.P., Gomez, F.G. and Varela, M.S. _928518
245			_aElectoral opportunism and water pricing with incomplete transfer of control rights
260			_aLocal Government Studies
300			_a46(6), Dec, 2020: p.1015-1038
520			_aOne of the forms of intervention in public services that lie beyond market forces is price control. While such regulation is justified by the need to achieve social goals, empirical evidence has shown that it is often used by politicians for electoral gain. This paper looks for evidence of opportunistic political behaviour in urban water pricing. Using data for 119 large Spanish cities covering the period 1998–2015, we find strong empirical evidence of the influence of the electoral cycle on water pricing insofar as price increases are significantly lower in the years immediately preceding municipal elections than in non-pre-election years. Furthermore, outsourcing water service provision does not mitigate the relationship between the electoral cycle and water pricing. This result could be explained by incomplete transfer of control rights when the urban water service is outsourced, which allows politicians to use their right to supervise water tariffs to their advantage. – Reproduced
650			_aControl rights, Electoral cycle, Privatisation, Political opportunism, Quantitative analysis, Spain, Urban water pricing _926911
773			_aLocal Government Studies
906			_aPOLITICAL OPPORTUNISM
942			_cAR