000			01276nam a22001577a 4500
999			_c518178 _d518178
008			210828b ||||| |||| 00| 0 eng d
100			_aFajardo, Gustavo _928656
245			_aSir, Yes, Sir! Hierarchy, coups and the political preferences of army officers
260			_aThe Economic Journal: A journal of the Royal Economic Society
300			_a130(629), Jul, 2020: p.1317-1345
520			_aI show that coups that break the chain of command polarise the military along hierarchical lines. I study an instance of Venezuelan history in which the political preferences of individual members of the army towards former coup leader Hugo Chávez became observable. Outranking Chávez at the time of the insubordination increases the probability of later opposing his presidency. Causal estimates rely on a fuzzy regression discontinuity design, where minimum time requirements for promotion in the army provide exogenous variation in the ranking of officers at the time of the coup. I discuss implications for the literature on civil–military relations. – Reproduced
650			_aArmed forces - Officers, Army - Officers, Defence _928657
773			_aThe Economic Journal: A journal of the Royal Economic Society
906			_aARMED FORCES - OFFICERS
942			_cAR