000			01166nam a22001457a 4500
999			_c518220 _d518220
008			210830b ||||| |||| 00| 0 eng d
100			_aKominers, Scott Duke and Teytelboym, Alexander _928684
245			_aThe parable of the auctioneer: Complexity in Paul R. milgrom's discovering prices
260			_aJournal of Economic Literature
300			_a58(4), Dec, 2020: p.1180-1196
520			_aDesigning marketplaces in complex settings requires both novel economic theory and real-world engineering, often drawing upon ideas from fields such as computer science and operations research. In Discovering Prices: Auction Design in Markets with Complex Constraints, Milgrom (2017) explains the theory and design of the United States' "incentive auction" that reallocated wireless spectrum licenses from television broadcasters to telecoms. Milgrom's account teaches us how economic designers can grapple with complexity both in theory and in practice. Along the way, we come to understand several different types of complexity that can arise in marketplace design. – Reproduced
773			_aJournal of Economic Literature
906			_aMARKETING
942			_cAR