000			01233nam a22001577a 4500
999			_c518476 _d518476
008			210927b ||||| |||| 00| 0 eng d
100			_aBertelli, A.M., Mela, V. and Woodhouse, E.F. _929510
245			_aCorruption, democracy, and privately financed infrastructure
260			_aAdministration & Society
300			_a53(3), Mar, 2021: p.327-352
520			_aDo political institutions moderate the influence of corruption on privately financed infrastructure projects? We argue that electoral competition incentivizes politicians to monitor bureaucratic corruption and focus on the public benefits of projects. Without such incentives, corruption is not monitored and the private benefits of bribes and favorable contract terms are responsible for increasing numbers of projects. Studying 116 countries between 1984 and 2012, we find that as public-sector corruption increases in democracies, no change in the number of projects is observed, while more projects emerge in non-democracies as corruption worsens. – Reproduced
650			_aPublic–private partnerships, Infrastructure, Electoral competition, Bureaucratic corruption _927685
773			_aAdministration & Society
906			_aCORRUPTION
942			_cAR