000			01132nam a22001577a 4500
999			_c518501 _d518501
008			210927b ||||| |||| 00| 0 eng d
100			_a Bizzotto, Jacopo and Vigier, Adrien _929570
245			_aFees, Reputation, and information production in the credit rating industry
260			_aAmerican Economic Journal Macroeconomics
300			_a13(2), May, 2021: p.1-34
520			_aWe compare a credit rating agency's incentives to acquire costly information when it is only paid for giving favorable ratings to the corresponding incentives when the agency is paid up-front, i.e., irrespective of the ratings assigned. We show that, in the presence of moral hazard, contingent fees provide stronger dynamic incentives to acquire information than up-front fees and may induce higher social welfare. When the fee structure is chosen by the agency, contingent fees arise as an equilibrium outcome, in line with the way the market for credit rating actually works. – Reproduced
650			_aCredit rating _929571
773			_aAmerican Economic Journal Macroeconomics
906			_aFINANCIAL SERVICES INDUSTRIES
942			_cAR