000			01378nam a22001577a 4500
999			_c519098 _d519098
008			220127b ||||| |||| 00| 0 eng d
100			_aKincaid, Harold _931993
245			_aConcrete ontology: Comments on Lauer, Little, and Lohse
260			_aPhilosophy of the Social Sciences
300			_a51(1), Jan, 2021: p.40-47
520			_aI share with all the other authors the view that conceptual metaphysics without close ties to science is of minimal value, that this holds for much of current work on social ontology, and that if there is value in social ontology, it has to be in contributing to empirical social science. I do perhaps disagree with all three authors about making any blanket statements concerning either instrumentalism or realism about the social sciences and their ontologies. I argue and try to show instead that if there are fruitful questions of social ontology, they are probably mostly local empirical issues raised by specific pieces of social science. Certain kinds of pluralism and instrumentalism may well make sense in some situations. I illustrate with debates over the need for psychological realism and revealed preference theory in economics. – Reproduced
650			_aInstrumentalism, Realism, Social ontology, Revealed preference theory _929331
773			_aPhilosophy of the Social Sciences
906			_aREALISM
942			_cAR